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Abstract
We study e±cient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heteroge-
neous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent bene¯ts by bundling
goods in her endowment. Even if agents' preferences are additive, no such rule exists.
JEL Classi¯cation: C71, D63, D71.
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1 Introduction
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects where each agent is
endowed with a set of objects and monetary transfers are not possible. Examples are the
exchange of equipment and tasks among workers or departments of a ¯rm (Pap¶ ai, 2005;
Atlamaz and Klaus, 2005). Our model of exchange includes housing markets (Shapley and
Scarf, 1974: each agent owns exactly one object, which can be traded) and multiple-type
housing markets (Moulin, 1995; Konishi et al., 2001: each agent's endowment consists
of one object of each type and agents are allowed to trade di®erent types of indivisible
objects). An exchange rule assigns to each trader a set of objects. We are interested
in exchange rules satisfying appealing properties such as e±ciency, individual rationality
(no agent is worse o® after trading) and robustness to manipulations. A strong non-
manipulation requirement, strategy-proofness (no agent bene¯ts from misrepresenting
her preferences), is known to be incompatible with e±ciency and individual rationality
(SÄ onmez, 1999; Konishi et al., 2001).
In exchange markets agents may also have an incentive to manipulate the outcome
using their endowments, for example, by hiding, destroying, or transferring part of them.
The study of hiding-proofness and destruction-proofness in the context of classical ex-
change economies goes back to Postlewaite (1979), while transfer-proof rules were studied
by Sertel and Ä Ozkal-Sanver (2002) for two-sided matching with endowments. Atlamaz
and Klaus (2005) analyzed these three manipulation possibilities for exchange markets
with indivisible goods. In particular, they show that e±cient and individually rational
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1rules are generally not immune to manipulations via endowments, with some exceptions
for two-agent exchange markets.
We are also interested in exchange rules that prevent the possibility of manipulation
via endowments, but focus on bundling-proofness: no agent bene¯ts from bundling goods
in her endowment. To ¯x ideas, we assume that bundling and decomposition of bundles
are costless and the only e®ect of bundling is that bundled objects have to be traded to-
gether. To keep the model simple we assume that agents' endowments consist of disjoint
sets of objects and interpret the objects in each set as being bundled. Now, an exchange
rule assigns to each agent a set of objects such that trade restrictions given by the agents'
endowment distribution are respected. Since bundling-proofness can be interpreted as a
much weaker requirement than strategy-proofness (Remark 1), there is hope to restore
compatibility of \non-manipulation" with e±ciency and individual rationality. Unfortu-
nately, even for additive preferences, no bundling-proof, e±cient, and individually rational
exchange rule exists (Theorem 1).
2 Exchange markets with indivisible objects
Let K be a ¯nite set of heterogeneous objects with jKj ¸ 2 and N = f1;:::;ng a ¯nite
set of agents (n ¸ 2). We denote by 2K the set of all subsets of K. Each agent i 2 N
has an endowment Bi that consists of disjoint sets of objects Bk




is such that (a) for all k 2 f1;:::;l(i)g, Bk
i 2 2K, and (b) for all k;k0 2 f1;:::;l(i)g
(k 6= k0), Bk
i \Bk0
i = ;. We say that objects in Bk
i are bundled. By Ei =
Sl(i)
k=1 Bk
i 2 2K we
denote the set of objects agent i owns. The set of all endowments for agent i is denoted
by Bi. For example, Bi = (B1
i ;B2
i ;B3
i ) = (fa;bg;fcg;fd;e;fg) means that agent i owns
objects a;b;c;d;e;f and Ei = fa;b;c;d;e;fg. Furthermore, objects a and b are bundled,
and objects d, e, and f are bundled as well. An endowment distribution B = (B1;:::;Bn)
satis¯es the following two conditions: (i) for all i 2 N, Bi 2 Bi and (ii) for all i;j 2 N
(i 6= j), Ei \ Ej = ;. We denote the set of all endowment distributions by B.
Each agent i 2 N has complete and transitive preferences Ri over 2K with Pi being
the associated strict preference relation. We let Ri denote the set of all preferences for
agent i, R = (Ri)i2N a preference pro¯le, and R = R1 £:::£Rn the set of all preference
pro¯les.
Given a preference pro¯le R 2 R and an endowment distribution B 2 B, we denote
an (exchange) market by (R;B). Since in the remainder of the article we assume that
the preference pro¯le remains ¯xed while endowment distributions may vary, we simply
denote a market by its endowment distribution B 2 B. An allocation for a market B 2 B
is a list (S1;:::;Sn) such that
1. each agent i 2 N receives some subset Si µ
Sn
i=1 Ei,
2. no two agents receive the same object, i.e., for all i;j 2 N (i 6= j), Si \ Sj = ;, and
3. objects that are bundled in an agent's endowment are assigned jointly, i.e., for all
i 2 N, Bi = (B1
i ;:::;B
l(i)
i ), and all k 2 f1;:::;l(i)g, either Bk




i2N Si = ;.
2The ¯rst two conditions are standard, while the third condition is speci¯c to our setting
and simply requires that an allocation respects all trade restrictions that bundling in the
endowments creates. Note that we allow for free disposal, that is,
Sn




Finally, notice that on the one hand agents are endowed with bundles of objects while
on the other hand preferences are not de¯ned over bundles but over subsets. The reason
for this way of modeling is that we assume that bundles impose trade restrictions but the
fact that objects are bundled does not change these objects physically.
3 E±ciency, individual rationality, and bundling-proofness
An (exchange) rule is a function ' that associates with each market B 2 B an allocation
'(B) = (Si)i2N. Given i 2 N, we call 'i(B) the allotment of agent i at '(B).
We assume that a rule only chooses (Pareto) e±cient allocations: for all B 2 B there
is no allocation (Si)i2N such that for all i 2 N, Si Ri 'i(B), with strict preference holding
for some j 2 N.
To express voluntary participation or individual rationality, we assume that agents
¯nd their allotments at least as good as their endowments: for all B 2 B and all i 2 N,
'i(B) Ri Ei.
The main property we focus on in this paper is bundling-proofness. We assume that
any agent can costlessly increase the degree of bundling in her endowment. By increasing
the degree of bundling we mean that an agent can merge some of the subsets in her
endowment to larger bundles, e.g., agent i with Bi = (B1
i ;B2
i ;B3
i ) = (fa;bg;fcg;fd;e;fg)
could bundle fcg with fd;e;fg and announce ^ Bi = (fa;bg;fc;d;e;fg). This bundling
implies that now objects c, d, e, and f have to be assigned to the same agent after trade.
More generally, for any agent i with endowment Bi a bundled endowment ^ Bi =
( ^ B1
i ;:::; ^ B
^ l(i)
i ) [^ l(i) · l(i)] is a partition of Ei such that for all k 2 f1;:::;l(i)g there
exists ^ k 2 f1;:::;^ l(i)g such that Bk
i µ ^ B
^ k
i , which means that ^ Bi is a coarser partition
than Bi. Given B 2 B, ( ^ Bi;B¡i) denotes the endowment distribution obtained from B by
replacing Bi by ^ Bi.
We require that if agent i bundles her endowment, then she ¯nds her allotment without
bundling at least as good as her allotment with bundling, given all other agents do not
manipulate their endowments. A rule ' is bundling-proof if for all B 2 B, all i 2 N, and
all bundled endowments ^ Bi, 'i(B) Ri 'i( ^ Bi;B¡i).
Remark 1. As mentioned in the Introduction, it is well-known that e±ciency, individual
rationality, and strategy-proofness are not compatible in our model (SÄ onmez, 1999).
Assume that a rule is e±cient and individually rational. Then, the power an agent
has by misrepresenting her preferences is to reduce the set of e±cient and individually
rational allocations, possibly to her bene¯t. By bundling objects in her endowment, an
agent also can reduce the set of e±cient and individually rational allocations. Note that
through preferences complementarities between any set of objects can be expressed, which
in combination with e±ciency and individual rationality may lead to trade restrictions that
also concern other agents' objects. By bundling fewer trade restrictions can be imposed
and therefore we can interpret bundling-proofness as a much weaker requirement than
strategy-proofness. }
3We consider now the additive preference domain: agent i's preferences are additive





k2T0 ui(k). We show that on this domain no rule is e±cient,
individually rational, and bundling-proof. Clearly, this result also holds on any preference
domain that contains the domain of additive preferences.
Theorem 1. For markets with additive preferences, no rule is e±cient, individually ra-
tional, and bundling-proof.
Proof. Let N = f1;2g, B = (B1;B2) such that B1 = (fag;fbg;fcg), B2 = (fdg;feg).
Preference pro¯le (R1;R2) has the following utility representation:
u1(a) = 1:5, u2(a) = 2:9,
u1(b) = 1:3, u2(b) = 1:8,
u1(c) = 1:1, u2(c) = 1:5,
u1(d) = 3, u2(d) = 3,
u1(e) = 0:01, u2(e) = 0:5.
Since all objects have positive values, by individual rationality no agent will give up an
object without receiving at least one other object from the other agent. By individual
rationality, agent 1 is willing to swap either fag, fbg, fcg, fa;bg, fa;cg, or fb;cg for fdg
or fd;eg (no individually rational swap for agent 1 involves only object e). By individual
rationality, agent 2 is willing to swap fdg for fa;b;cg, fa;bg, fa;cg, or fb;cg or swap fd;eg
for fa;b;cg, fa;bg, or fa;cg. Hence, the only individually rational allocations are A1 =
(fa;b;cg;fd;eg), A2 = (fc;dg;fa;b;eg), A3 = (fb;dg;fa;c;eg), A4 = (fa;dg;fb;c;eg),
A5 = (fc;d;eg;fa;bg), and A6 = (fb;d;eg;fa;cg). Allocation A1 is not e±cient (it is
Pareto dominated by A2). Among the remaining allocations, allocation A4 gives the
highest utility to agent 1.
Now assume that agent 1 bundles objects b and c, i.e., consider ( ^ B1;B2) where ^ B1 =
(fag;fb;cg). Then the only e±cient and individually rational allocation for ( ^ B1;B2) is
A4 = (fa;dg);fb;c;eg). Thus, by bundling-proofness, '(B) = A4.
Next, assume that agent 2 bundles objects d and e, i.e., consider (B1; ^ B2) where ^ B2 =
(fd;eg). Then the only e±cient and individually rational allocations for (B1; ^ B2) are A5 =
(fc;d;eg);fa;bg) and A6 = (fb;d;eg;fa;cg). If '2(B1; ^ B2) = A5, then, in contradiction
to bundling-proofness, fa;bg = '2(B1; ^ B2) P2 '2(B1;B2) = fb;c;eg. If '2(B1; ^ B2) = A6,
then, again in contradiction to bundling-proofness, fa;cg = '2(B1; ^ B2) P2 '2(B1;B2) =
fb;c;eg.
Hence, for n = 2, e±ciency, individual rationality, and bundling-proofness are incom-
patible. For n > 2; we simply add agents who prefer their endowments to any other set
of objects. Since only agents 1 and 2 trade in this case, the incompatibility persists for
n > 2.
Note that the example used in the proof of Theorem 1 is not only minimal with respect
to the number of agents, but also with respect to the number of objects used.
44 Conclusion
The setup presented in this paper di®ers from the standard exchange model with hetero-
geneous indivisible goods (Pap¶ ai, 2005; Atlamaz and Klaus, 2005) in that it allows for
more structure in agents' endowments that implicitly expresses trade restrictions. Our
impossibility result in this framework is in accordance with the non-existence of e±cient,
individually rational, and hiding-proof rules (Atlamaz and Klaus, 2005) and, more gen-
erally, with the non-existence of e±cient, individually rational, and strategy-proof rules
(SÄ onmez, 1999).
Since we assume that bundling is costless and objects do not change by bundling, agents
can also decompose or regroup bundles in their endowments (Dimitrov and Haake, 2005).
Note that when decomposing endowment, more feasible allocations are created. Hence,
as demonstrated in the next example, decomposition may in fact be e±ciency enhancing.
Therefore, e±ciency and \decomposition-proofness" are not compatible.
Example 1. Let N = f1;2g and B = (B1;B2) such that B1 = (fa;bg) and B2 = (;).
Preferences are additive such that u1(a) = 1, u1(b) = ¡1, u2(a) = ¡1, and u2(b) = 1. The
only feasible allocations are (fa;bg;;) and (;;fa;bg) with ¯nal utilities (0;0).
Next assume that agent 1 decomposes B1 into B0
1 = (fag;fbg). Thus, for B0 =
(B0
1;B2) the additional feasible allocations are (fag;fbg) and (fbg;fag). The associated
¯nal utilities are (1;1) and (¡1;¡1). Hence, the only feasible and e±cient allocation is
(fag;fbg) with ¯nal utilities (1;1).
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